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Selling uninsured motorist1 insurance coverage is big business in
the State of Florida.
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The Availability of Excess Damages in First-Party
Bad Faith Cases: A Distinction Without a Difference*
I. Introduction
Selling uninsured motorist 1 insurance coverage is big business in
the State of Florida. In 1989, insurers earned $451,151,260 as a result
of the sale of uninsured motorist policies.' This represents nearly five
percent of the over $10 billion in premiums earned from all types of
coverage.3
When an insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage or any
other type of insurance,4 the insured reasonably expects to have any
* The author expresses his gratitude to the firm of Preddy, Kutner, Hardy,
Rubinoff, Brown & Thompson; David S. Nelson and Love Phipps, Esqs.; and James
Seymour, editor of THE FLORIDA UNDERWRITER for their briefs, opinions and
statistics, and to Eric Tilton, Esq. for providing insight into the legislative intent of the
1982 and 1990 versions of the bad faith statute.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.727(1),(3) (1989) state:
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurance policy which provides bodily
injury liability coverage shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this
state with respect to any specifically insured or identified motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this state unless uninsured motorist
coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom ....
(3) For the purposes of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor ve-
hicle" shall, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be
deemed to include an insured motor vehicle when the liability insurer
thereof:
(a) Is unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its
insured within the limits specified therein because of insolvency; or
(b) Has provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which are
less than the total damages sustained by the person legally entitled to re-
cover damages.
2. 1989 Property & Casualty Statistical Report, 7 FLORIDA UNDERWRITER 36,
44-45 (July 1990). (Although references within the survey refer to "Priv. Pass. Auto."
the editor has informed this Author that the totals listed refer solely to uninsured mo-
torist coverage.).
3. Id. at 37, 44-45.
4. See United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644
F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (mortgage guaranty insurance contract); Reliance Ins.
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legitimate claim promptly paid. Unfortunately, the insured may be dis-
appointed to find that his5 friendly insurer who holds him in its "good
hands"' is applying the squeeze by refusing to pay a legitimate unin-
sured motorist claim. Until recently, the insurer, who claimed to be
"like a good neighbor," could collect uninsured motorist premiums, de-
lay or refuse to pay a valid claim for the limits of the policy, and if
faced with a judgment in excess of the policy limits, pay only the policy
limits without liability for the excess.
In 1989, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida decided Jones v. Continental Insurance Co.,7 which permit-
ted insureds to recover damages in excess of the stated policy limits, as
a matter of law, in a first party bad faith8 action. Another federal dis-
trict court has refused to apply Jones insofar as it permits recovery of
excess damages as a matter of law, holding instead that these damages
are recoverable, if proven to have been causally related to the bad
Co. v. Barile Excavating & Pipeline Co., 685 F. Supp. 839 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (insur-
ance company acting as surety on a performance bond); Forston v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (malpractice insurer-claim dismissed
as premature); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 555 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1990)
(personal injury protection benefits pursuant to section 627.736 (1983)); Kujawa v.
Manhattan Nat. Life Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1989) (life insurance); Schimmel
v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 506 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (property
damage insurance covering household goods).
5. The author does not suggest that any connotation be placed on the use of the
male pronoun in gender neutral situations. "The use of he as pronoun for nouns em-
bracing both genders is a simple, practical convention rooted in the beginnings of the
English language. He has lost all suggestion of maleness in these circumstances." W.
STRUNK & E. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (3d ed. 1979).
6. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. 331, 342, 396
A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (Spaeth, J. dissenting). "The insurer's promise to
the insured to... put him in 'good hands' ... or to be 'on his side' hardly suggests that
the insurer will abandon the insured in his time of need."; See also Weese v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 115, 117 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[W]hen an insured purchases a
contract of insurance, he buys insurance-not a lot of vexatious, time-consuming, ex-
pensive litigation with his insurer.")(quoting Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Ins. Co., 352 S.E.2d 73 (W.Va. 1986)).
7. 716 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
8. Bad faith is:
The opposite of "good faith," generally implying or involving actual or
constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect
or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted
by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or
sinister motive.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 176 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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Likewise, in the Florida state courts, decisions are in conflict. In
Wahl v. Insurance Co. of North America10 the court permitted the re-
covery of excess damages as a matter of law,"' and in McLeod v. Conti-
nental Insurance Co.,'2 the court refused to direct a verdict that excess
damages are, as a matter of law, recoverable, and further refused to
instruct the jury similarly.'- The questions whether excess damages are
recoverable and if so, whether they are recoverable as a matter of law
are currently awaiting appellate resolution.' 4
A cause of action for bad faith is not new in Florida. Indeed, it has
existed in the third party context for over fifty years.15 Florida courts
have defined a third party bad faith action as
one brought by an insured against his insurer because of its failure
to settle a third party tort claim for a reasonable sum ... where a
reasonably prudent person would do so, and the wrongful refusal to
settle exposes the insured to liability in an amount in excess of the
policy limits .... 6
The injured third party, after becoming a judgment creditor, may then
institute suit against the tortfeasor's liability insurer for the portion of
the judgment which exceeds the insured's available coverage based
upon a violation of Florida Statute section 624.155(1)(b)(1). This third
party is, in effect, a third party beneficiary of the insurance contract
9. Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 89-613-Civ-ORL-19 at 10 (M.D. Fla. 1989)
(Order dated June 26, 1990).
10. No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
11. No. 87-1187-CA(17), Excerpt of Proceedings at 20 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct.
1987).
12. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785 (1990).
13. Brief of Appellant at 20, McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 Fla. L. Weekly
(1990).
14. McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15FIa. L. Weekly 2785 (1990)(The Second
District Court of Appeal certified the following question to the Supreme Court as one
of great public importance: WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF DAM-
AGES IN A FIRST-PARTY ACTION FOR BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE
AN UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE CLAIM?). Id. at 2787. On January
10, 1991, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified the identical question to the
Florida Supreme Court in Jones v. Continental Insurance Co., 920 F.2d 847 (11 th Cir.
1991).
15. Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815,184 So. 852, (1939).
16. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339, 341 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
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between the defendant and the defendant's insurer.17 Throughout the
United States, courts have rendered a plethora of decisions in bad faith
cases - particularly third party bad faith cases. The same is not true of
first party bad faith", which has arguably existed for less than 20 years
in the United States and only since 198219 or 198320 in Florida.
While the insurer/insured relationship in third party bad faith
cases is relatively settled,21 the same cannot be said for the insurer/
insured relationship in first party bad faith cases,22 where an insured
seeks payment of his own claim from his insurance company. Within
the past decade, cases such as Jones, Wahl, McLeod, and Cocuzzi v.
Allstate Insurance Co. 23 have drawn the attention of the insurance in-
dustry and the trial bar. Of particular interest to both plaintiffs and
defendants are those decisions addressing the damages recoverable in a
first party bad faith case, especially damages in excess 24 of the unin-
sured motorist coverage. "
This Note will first provide a brief overview of bad faith law in the
United States and particularly in Florida. The overview will begin with
17. Cardenas v. Miami-Dade Yellow Cab Co., 538 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
18. First party bad faith exists where "the insured is seeking payment of his own
claim from the insurance company." Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp. 937,
940 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
19. FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1982).
20. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 69 n.5, (4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983), petition denied, 441 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1983).
21. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Guttierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, (Fla. 1980), on
remand, 388 So. 2d 54, (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922
(1981); Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975).
22. Compare, Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1973), cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975) (There is no fiduciary relation-
ship between he insured and insurer with respect to an uninsured motorist claim. In-
sured and insurer occupy a debtor-creditor relationship - excess damages in a first
party claim denied.) with Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 69
n.5, (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (First party action unavailable because it arose prior to
section 624.155, however, Judge Hurley's concurring opinion recognizes the statute's
applicability to both first and third party claims.); Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 670 F.
Supp. 937 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
23. No. 89-613-Civ-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
24. The author addresses only those damages assessed in excess of the stated
policy limits. Excess damages are those types of damages which exceed the policy lim-
its but would be covered under the terms of the policy as opposed to punitive damages
assessed as a penalty for prohibited conduct. See FLA. STAT. § 624.155(4) (1989).
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third party bad faith through its evolution into first party bad faith,
including a discussion of the availability of excess damages - essential
to an understanding of the Jones v. Continental Insurance Co.s5 cases.
Next, this Note will examine the court's opinions in Jones along with
reference to Cocuzzi, McLeod and Wahl. Finally, the impact of Jones
as well as prior and subsequent cases and section 624.155 will be ana-
lyzed. The author will present an argument that the language of sec-
tion 624.155 leaves no other reasonable conclusion except that excess
damages are recoverable, as a matter of law, in first party bad faith
cases and that Florida courts should permit insureds to recover excess
damages in first party bad faith cases.
II. Background
Uninsured motorist coverage, also referred to as underinsured mo-
torist coverage,2 6 is unlike any other type of insurance. In Florida, 27 as
in most states, 8 uninsured motorist coverage is mandatory in all insur-
ance policies, subject to the express rejection of such coverage by the
insured.29 Uninsured motorist coverage has been described as a "hy-
brid" or a blending of first and third party insurance."0 It bears a re-
semblance to first party insurance, specifically medical insurance, but it
also functions in the third party form because it becomes effective when
the uninsured motorist is legally at fault.3' Uninsured motorist cover-
age then becomes, in effect, the liability insurance coverage for the un-
insured motorist.
A clear understanding of the current status of Florida first party
bad faith 2 law must begin with a brief review of the principles of Flor-
25. Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp 937 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Jones v.
Continental Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Jones v. Continental Ins. 920
F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1991).
26. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3)(b) (1989).
27. Id. § 627.727 (1989).
28. All states require some form of uninsured motorist coverage. The District of
Columbia, although not requiring uninsured motorist coverage to be purchased by in-
sureds, does require insurers to contribute to an uninsured motorist fund. See, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-2114 (1988).
29. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1989).
30. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.9(e) (1988).
31. Id.; Florida Statute section 627.727(l) (1989) requires uninsured motorist
coverage "for the protection of persons insured hereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles .... "
32. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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ida third party bad faith law.3 3 The Florida Supreme Court, in Auto
Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw,34 first pronounced that an insurance
contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
between the parties in the context of a third party claim.3 5 The insurer,
in conducting the defense of its insured, must exercise that degree of
care which a person of ordinary care and prudence would exercise in
the management of that person's own business.3 6
A. Duty of Good Faith Extended to First Parties
In 1980 the Florida Supreme Court expanded the parameters of
bad faith in Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. v. Guttierrez.3 7 Building
on the fiduciary relationship announced in Shaw, the court in Boston
Old Colony recognized that in a third party situation, where the in-
sured's fate was in the hands of the insurer, 8 the insurer must "exer-
cise such control and make such decisions in good faith and with due
regard for the interests of the insured."3 9 If the insurer breaches this
common law duty of good faith in a third party situation, the insurer
may be liable for amounts in excess of the policy limits"0 and for puni-
tive damages, if the insurer's conduct so warrants. "' In Florida, there-
33. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (defining third party bad faith).
34. Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852, (1939).
35. Id. at 830, 184 So. at 859.
36. Id.
37. 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981).
38.
For when the insured has surrendered to the insurer all control over
the handling of the claim, including all decisions with regard to litigation
and settlement, then the insurer must assume a duty to exercise such con-
trol and make such decisions in good faith and with due regard for the
interests of the insured.
Id. at 785.
39. Id.; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 4*75 (5th Cir. 1969);
The Boston Old Colony court recognized that the good faith duty required an insurer
to "investigate the facts, give fair consideration to a settlement offer that is not unrea-
sonable under the facts, and settle, if possible, where a reasonably prudent person,
faced with the prospect of paying the total recovery would do so." Boston Old Colony,
386 So. 2d at 785.
40. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 412 F.2d 475.
41. Compare Travelers Indem. Co. v. Butchikas, 313 So. 2d 101, (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) aff'd, 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1977) (conduct not warranting punitive
damages) with Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 525 (Fla.
[Vol. 15
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fore, an insured in a third party bad faith action may recover not only
amounts in excess of the policy limits,42 but also extra-contractual
damages.43
In contrast to third party bad faith, there was no common law
cause of action for first party bad faith prior to 1982. In Baxter v.
Royal Indemnity Co.," the First District Court of Appeal distin-
guished first party insurance from third party insurance, stating that
the fiduciary relationship interest in the third party scenario was not
present in the first party context.45 Rather, the relationship was actu-
ally that of debtor and creditor"4 where the parties occupied an adver-
sarial relationship toward one another,47 preventing any extra-contrac-
tual recovery by the insured." Justice Dekle, in his dissent, pointed out
the fallacy of disparate treatment of first and third party bad faith:
[I]t would be anachronistic to hold that an insurer owes a duty of
good faith in handling the liability claim of a third person totally
unrelated to the parties to the contract of insurance while at the
same time holding that the insurer owed no such obligation of good
faith to its own insured, who has paid premiums ... for the specific
purpose of protecting himself . . .
1974) (insurer concealed and misrepresented facts to the insured - punitive damages
warranted); Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, No. 88-0629-CIV-Spellman
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
February 12, 1990 - excess damages in the form of punitive damages not warranted);
See generally Annotation, Recoverability of Punitive Damages in Action By Insured
Against Liability Insurer For Failure to Settle Claim Against Insured, 85 A.L.R.3d
1211 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
42. See, e.g., Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1973); Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Judgments in excess of the policy limits will usually wind up in the hands
of the third party in a third party bad faith case. Neyer, Prepared For Any Contin-
gency; Casualty Contingency Protection; Reinsurance, 90 Best's Review 60 (No.8,
1989).
43. Extra-contractual damages typically wind up in the pocket of the insured as
opposed to a third party. Neyer, supra note 42.
44. Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1973), cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975).
45. Id. at 656.
46. Id. at 657.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66, 68
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
49. Baxter, 317 So. 2d at 731 (Dekle, J., dissenting).
1991] 303
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With one exception50 , it remained the rule in Florida until 1982 that a
cause of action for first party bad faith did not exist.
In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted section 624.155, which
has come to be known as the "bad faith" statute.5 1 This statute pro-
vides that "[a]ny person may bring a civil action against an insurer
when such person is damaged" 52 by several specifically delineated acts.
For purposes of first party bad faith in general and for this note in
particular, section 624.155(1)(b)1 is the focus. This section permits
any person to bring an action against an insurer when damaged by the
insurer "[n]ot attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all
the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly
and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for his
interests." 53
However, the insurer is not left without protection. As a condition
precedent to a bad faith action pursuant to section 624.155, the insured
must give 60 days prior notice to the insurer and the Department of
Insurance,54 on a form provided by the Department of Insurance. 55
This notice must delineate the specific statutory provision allegedly vio-
lated, 56 the facts and circumstances of the violation,57 the name of any
individuals involved in the alleged violation,58 reference to any specific
relevant policy language59 and a statement that the notice is given in
order to pursue the remedy authorized by section 624.155.6o With the
passage of section 624.155, Florida had codified the previously an-
nounced common law cause of action for third party bad faith. 1
But this codification had little practical effect on the common law
prohibition against first party bad faith. It was a year until the federal
courts in Florida began recognizing a statutory cause of action for first
50. Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D.
Fla. 1976).
51. FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1982).
52. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1).
53. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)1.
54. FLA. STAT. §§ 624.155(2)(a),(b).
55. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b).
56. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)1.
57. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)2.
58. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)3.
59. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)4.
60. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)5.
61. See, e.g., Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1939);
Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922
(1981); Baxter, 285 So. 2d 652.
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party bad faith under section 624.155(1)(b)1. The first such decision
was Rowland v. Safeco Insurance Co. 62 The plaintiffs alleged that
Safeco had violated section 624.155(1)(b)1 when it refused to pay a
claim for uninsured motorist benefits. Safeco moved to dismiss, alleging
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. In deciding whether a cause
of action existed, the court acknowledged that prior to the enactment of
section 624.155 there was no first party bad faith absent any indepen-
dent tort.63 However, section 624.155 created such a cause of action for
first party bad faith because section 624.155(1)(b)1 enabled any person
to sue an insurer.6 4 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on sup-
porting dicta from Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Romer. 5 The Romer court stated:
Although it need not be decided here, it is arguable that with the
passage of this legislation, Florida has joined the ranks of those
states which impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in insurance contracts. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973). If
this is so, then proof of a breach of the covenant would permit
recovery in tort in first party, as well as third party, insurance
claims.66
The Rowland court also made reference to legislative history
which arguably showed a legislative intent to create a cause of action
for first party bad faith. The House Committee On Insurance stated in
its 1982 Staff Report that section 624.155
[S]ubparagraph (f) (1.) requires insurers to deal in good faith to
settle claims. Current case law requires this standard in liability
claims, but not in uninsured motorist coverage; the sanction is that
a company is subject to a judgment in excess of policy limits. This
section would apply to all insurance policies.67
This language, it was urged, evinced the legislature's intent to create a
62. 634 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
63. Id. at 614.
64. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
65. 432 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
66. Id. at 69 n.5 (Hurley, J., concurring).
67. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REvISION (HB 4F; As
Amended by HB 10G) at 12 (June 3, 1982).
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first party cause of action for bad faith.68 The court held that even in a
first party case, the insured was entitled to the damages provided for in
section 624.155(3).69 What the court failed to address is the equally
compelling language which supports the applicability of section
624.155 to first party actions. Specifically, section 624.155(2)(b) pro-
vides that "[i]f the person bringing the civil action is a third party
claimant, he shall not be required to reference the specific policy lan-
guage if the insurer has not provided a copy of the policy to the third
party claimant pursuant to written request."7
This language is conspicuously absent from first party decisions
relying in whole or in part on the plain language of the statute. The
logic is inescapable. Why would the Legislature draft legislation (urged
by the insurer not to apply to first party cases) and specifically exclude
compliance with section 624.155(2)(b)4 for third party claimants if
section 624.155 did not apply to first party claimants as well? Ac-
cepting the insurer's argument leads to the illogical conclusion, that be-
cause section 624.155 applies only to third party cases and section
624.155(2)(b)4 excuses third party claimants from compliance with
that subsection, no one need comply with the provisions of section
624.155(2) (b)4. The Legislature intended that section 624.155 apply to
first and third party causes of action and excuse only third party claim-
ants from compliance with section 624.155(2)(b)4.7 1
In 1986, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida decided United Guaranty Residential Insurance Co. v. Alli-
ance Mortgage Co. 72 The case was before the court on United Guar-
anty's motion to dismiss Alliance's counterclaim alleging breach of con-
tract and bad faith.73 Alliance argued that although there existed no
common law first party bad faith, the enactment of section
624.155(l)(b) 1 did provide such a cause of action.74 The court recog-
nized the lack of controlling state court decisions, and looked to the
Romer75 and Rowland 6 opinions.
68. Rowland, 634 F. Supp. at 615.
69. Id.
70. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(b)4 (1982) (emphasis added).
71. Telephone interview with Eric Tilton, Esquire, Editor-in-Chief of the 1982
version of section 624.155.
72. 644 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 340.
75. Romer, 432 So. 2d 66.
76. Rowland, 634 F. Supp. 613.
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United argued that section 624.155 did not specifically refer to
first party claims, and therefore, only codified third party bad faith law.
The court rejected that argument, based upon the language of section
624.155(1) and the holding in Baxter." Furthermore, application of
section 624.155 to first and third party claims was consistent with the
legislative scheme to impose liability on insurers who act "inequitably
vis-a-vis their insureds. 17  The Legislature chose not to exclude first
party coverage from section 624.155(1)(b)(1) and therefore stated, as
set forth in the 1982 Staff Report "[t]his section would apply to all
insurance policies. ' 79
The first Florida state court decision permitting a first party bad
faith cause of action was Opperman v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Co.80 In Opperman, the court held that section 624.155 created a
first party cause of action, and further, that the duty of the insurer to
act in good faith in the first party situation was akin to the duty to act
in good faith when handling third party claims.81 Subsequent Florida
decisions, both state8 2 and federal, 83 followed Romer, Rowland and
Opperman.
The courts had now solidified the common law concept of first
party bad faith. The Legislature affirmed the existence of a first party
cause of action when it passed section 624.155. Despite the settling of
the issue of availability of a first party action under section 624.155 by
the courts and Legislature, insurers continue to maintain that no such
77. "Under the rationale of Florida's third party bad faith decisions, because the
insurer has the right to completely control the defense and act as attorney-in-fact on
behalf of the insured, a duty of good faith arises out of the insurer-insured relation-
ship." Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. discharged, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975). United Guar., 644 F. Supp. at 341 n.3.
78. Id. at 341.
79. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REVISION (HB 4F; As
Amended by HB 10G) (June 3, 1982).
80. 515 So. 2d. 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 523 So. 2d. 578
(Fla. 1988).
81. Id. at 266.
82. See, e.g., McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785 (1990);
Cardenas v. Miami-Dade Yellow Cab Co., 538 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988) rev. denied, 549 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1989); Wahl v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 87-
1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Taylor,
No. 84-18844-CA(02) (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1984).
83. See, e.g., Jones, 670 F. Supp. 937; Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New
York, No. 88-0629-Civ-Spellman (S.D. Fla. 1988); Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
89-613-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
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cause of action exists."4
B. Damage Assessment in First Party Bad Faith Actions
The issue of what types of damages are proper in a first party bad
faith case is not as settled. Florida Statute section 624.155(3) provides,
"[u]pon adverse adjudication at trial or upon appeal, the insurer shall
be liable for damages, together with court costs and reasonable attor-
ney's fees incurred by the plaintiff."8 5
The legislative history of section 624.155(3) implies that the legis-
lative intent was to permit the recovery of judgments in excess of the
policy limits, and that this applies to all insurance policies.86 Yet,
Florida court decisions conflict as to whether damages in excess of the
policy limits are available in first party bad faith cases, and if so,
whether they are available as a matter of law87 or whether they must
be proven.88
In the first party bad faith case, the insured typically demands
that the insurer settle his claim for a specific dollar value. The insurer
refuses to settle and either party demands arbitration or they litigate
the claim.' If the insured receives an arbitration award or jury award
84. Brief of Appellant at 25, Continental Ins. Co. v. Jones, No. 89-5911 (11th
Cir. 1989).
85. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3) (1989).
86. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REvISION (HB 4F, as
amended by HB lOe)(emphasis added).
87. Jones, 716 F. Supp. 1460; Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct.
1987).
88. Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 89-613-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. 1989);
McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 FLA. L. WEEKLY 2785 (1990) -
89. As a procedural caveat, it must be noted here that as of the date of the
writing of this note, there exists a conflict as to whether a bad faith claim made pursu-
ant to section 624.155 must be filed contemporaneously with the underlying claim for
first party benefits. See, e.g., Schimmel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 506 So. 2d 1162
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (filing of bad faith claim subsequent to breach of prop-
erty insurance contract claim barred by rule against splitting causes of action);
Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 903 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1990) (in view
of Schimmel and other Florida cases indicating a division of reasoning, the Eleventh
Circuit certified the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court:
1. DOES AN INSURED'S CLAIM AGAINST AN UNINSURED MO-
TORIST CARRIER UNDER SECTION 624.155(l)(b)I., FLORIDA
STATUTES, FOR ALLEGEDLY FAILING TO SETTLE THE UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST CLAIM IN GOOD FAITH ACCRUE BEFORE
THE CONCLUSION OF THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION FOR
[Vol. 15
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in excess of the policy limits, the damages sought are referred to as the
"shortfall", 90 that is, the difference between the policy limits and the
awarded amount.
The first Florida decision to implicitly address the issue of excess
damages was Opperman v. Nationwide Mutual Life Insurance Co.91 In
Opperman, the insureds received an arbitration award in excess of their
uninsured motorist limits and sued the insurer for bad faith refusal to
settle. 2 In arriving at the holding that a first party action existed under
the statute, the court examined the legislative history 3 and other deci-
sions in Federal courts,94 and found that the statute clearly provided a
first party cause of action for bad faith.95 Implicit in the court's opinion
is that the remedy for first party bad faith is the same as for third
party bad faith, that is, the excess award.9 6
A Florida circuit court case broke ground by holding that the
shortfall was the proper amount of damages in first party bad faith
cases. In Wahl v. Insurance Co. of North America,9 7 the insured was
rendered comatose as the result of an automobile accident.98 Although
the insurer recognized the value of the policy to be in excess of the
policy limits, it made no offer to settle. 9  The matter was arbitrated,
resulting in an excess award.' The judge heard arguments and held
that the shortfall was recoverable as a matter of law upon proof of bad
THE CONTRACTUAL UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE
BENEFITS?
2. IF SO, IS JOINDER OF THE CLAIM UNDER SECTION
624.155(1)(b)1. IN THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION FOR CON-
TRACTUAL UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS PERMISSIBLE?
3. IF SO, IS JOINDER OF THE SECTION 624.155(1)(B)1. CLAIM
WITH THE CONTRACTUAL CLAIM MANDATORY?
Blanchard, 903 F.2d at 1400.
90. Brief of Appellant at 27, McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785.
91. 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) rev. denied, 523 So. 2d 578
(Fla. 1988).
92. Id. at 264.
93. Id. at 265.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 29.
97. No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987); Brief of Appellant at 29,
McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785.
98. Id.
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faith. 1 ' At least one other Florida circuit court has held similarly,10 2 as
has one federal district court.10 3
Another federal district court has held that although the shortfall
may be a proper element of damages, it is not available as a matter of
law, but must be proven in accordance with traditional tort and con-
tract law.'04 A Florida circuit court has refused to instruct the jury
that the shortfall is, as a matter of law, the appropriate measure of
damages. 0 5
III. First Party Bad Faith Damages as Applied in Jones v.
Continental
Jones v. Continental Insurance Co.'06 was one of the first deci-
sions, applying Florida law, which permitted insureds to recover
amounts in excess' 0 7 of their uninsured motorist' 018 coverage limits for
bad faith refusal to settle'09 an uninsured motorist claim. Continental
insured Thomas and Mary Ann Jones under a uninsured motorist pol-
icy. 1 0 This policy was in effect on January 29, 1984, when the Jones'
daughter Karen was killed when the car in which she was a passenger
was struck by a drunk driver."' The uninsured/underinsured" 2 limits
of coverage were $300,000."'3 Because the policy covered two of the
Jones' automobiles, Florida law permitted stacking of limits based upon
the number of vehicles.' 1 ' Therefore, there was a total of $600,000 in
uninsured motorist benefits available."15
101. Id. at 30-31.
102. Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New
York v. Taylor, No. 84-18844-CA (02) (Fla. l1th Cir. Ct. 1984).
103. 716 F. Supp. at 1460.
104. Order at 10, Cocuzzi v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 89-613-Civ-ORL-19 (M.D.
Fla. 1989).
105. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 20.
106. 716 F. Supp. 1456.
107. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
108. FLA. STAT. §§ 624.155(1),(3).
109. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)1.
110. Jones, 670 F. Supp. at 938.
111. Brief of Appellees at 1, Continental Ins. Co. v. Jones, No. 89-5911 (11th
Cir. 1989).
112. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3)(b).
113. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 2.
114. FLA. STAT. § 627.4132.
115. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 2.
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The Plaintiffs made a written demand on Continental for the en-
tire $600,000 limit.'16 "Their attorney sent a five page letter to Conti-
nental detailing: (1) Karen's lack of fault because she was a passenger;
(2) the limited insurance available from the tort feasors; and (3) the
emotional loss sustained by Mr. and Mrs. Jones. 11 7 Their counsel re-
ceived a reply denying the demand for the $600,000 limits and advising
them to get ready to arbitrate. 18 Continental, on its own evaluation of
the claim, established a $600,000 reserve. 119
The Plaintiffs demanded arbitration and their depositions were
taken.120 A scrapbook highlighting important points in Karen Jones'
life was provided to Continental. "Thus, by the middle of May, Conti-
nental knew that Karen was a model daughter-she was a college level
tennis player, a respected piano player, an excellent student, and she
had just transferred colleges just to be close to her parents."'' Even
Continental's counsel's evaluation of the case detailed the risks of liti-
gating the claim:
In a letter dated May 7, 1984 Continental's own counsel evaluated
the case as follows: '[B]oth parents made very good witnesses. The
girl is a model daughter in all respects. The scrapbooks and photo
albums present a detailed emotional picture of their daughter's life,
and the accident is one of aggravated liability. 1 22
Still, there was no offer of settlement. Continental failed to make an
offer until the eve of arbitration, when Continental offered $250,000
per parent for a total of $500,000.123 The Plaintiffs rejected this offer
and the matter proceeded to arbitration. 2
4
During the arbitration, Continental defended the claim by alleging
that Karen was negligent for not wearing a seat belt.'25 The arbitrators
rendered a $1,000,000 award, $500,000 per parent."2" Continental peti-
tioned to limit the amount of the arbitration award to the $600,000
116. Id
117. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 1-2.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id.
120. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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policy limit, and the Plaintiffs challenged the petition to modify claim-
ing that the award was not defective. 127 The trial court entered judg-
ment against Continental for the policy limits. 28
The Plaintiffs filed a bad faith action in state court against Conti-
nental seeking damages for Continental's alleged bad faith refusal to
settle their claim for the death of their daughter. 2 ' While the action
was pending on Continental's motion to dismiss,130 Continental re-
moved the action to federal district court.' 3' Continental claimed that
section 624.155 did not recognize an action for bad faith involving a
claim for first-party benefits such as uninsured motorist coverage. 132
The Plaintiffs argued to the contrary, that the bad faith statute applied
equally to first and third party claims alike. 33 The judge agreed with
the Plaintiffs, M and in his Opinion and Order on Continental's Motion
to Dismiss held that section 624.155(1)(b)1, which made it illegal for
an insurer not to attempt in good faith to settle claims, applied to first
party actions as well.' 3 5
The case proceeded to trial on the bad faith claim and at the close
of evidence, the Plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict'- 6 asserting that
as a matter of law, if Continental was found to have violated section
624.155(l)(b)1, they were entitled to the excess arbitration award of
$366,750.137 The court ruled that this was a proper element of damages
to be submitted to the jury. 8" A verdict form comprised of special in-
terrogatories was submitted to the jury.3 9
127. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1457.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Continental moved to dismiss the first party bad faith claim, maintaining
that section 624.155 did not recognize a first party cause of action for bad faith, a
position that Continental has steadfastly maintained, even in the irstant appeal. Brief
of Appellant, supra note 84, at 4.
131. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1457; 28 U.S.C. § 1332; 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
132. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
133. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 4.
134. 716 F. Supp at 1457.
135. Brief of Appellant, supra note 84 at 4.
136. FED. R. CIv. PRO. 50(a).
137. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1457-58.
138. Id. at 1458.
139.
The special interrogatories submitted and the jury's responses (in italics)
are set forth in their entirety as follows:
I. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Continental
312 [Vol. 15
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The jury returned a special verdict against Continental, finding
that it did not attempt to settle the Jones' claim in good faith.1 40 How-
ever, the jury found "zero" damages.1 41 The Plaintiffs filed motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict1 42 and for new trial.143 The judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict motion concerned the determination
of damages and requested judgment be entered for $366,750.00.144 The
motion for new trial alleged that the damages assessed, or rather, not
assessed, were grossly inadequate and contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence. 145
After stating the proper standard for deciding a motion for judg-
Insurance Company did not attempt in good faith to settle claims of Plain-
tiffs when, under all the circumstances, it could have and should have done
so, and had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insureds and with due
regard for their interests?
YES Yes NO _
2. Do you find from the totality of the circumstances that Continental
Insurance Company committed or performed any or all of the following
acts with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice:
a) fail to adopt and implement standards for the proper investigation
of claims?
YES - NO No
b) fail to acknowledge and act properly upon communications with
respect to claims?
YES - NO No
c) deny claims without conducting reasonable investigations based
upon available information?
YES - NO No
d) fail to promptly provide a reasonable explanation in writing to the
insured of the basis in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or ap-
plicable law, for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise
settlement?
YES Yes NO
If you answered "No" to both questions 1 and 2, you need not answer
question No. 3. If you answered "Yes" to question 1 or question 2, please
answer question 3 below.
3. What is the total amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiffs and
caused by the acts of Continental Insurance Company. 0
SO SAY WE ALL THIS 20 day of April, 1989.
Id. at 1458 n.2.
140. Id. at-1458.
141. Id.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
143. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1458; FED. R. CIv. PRo. 59.
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ment notwithstanding the verdict," the court succinctly presented the
issue of what the proper measure of damages should be in a first party
bad faith insurance action under section 624.155.147 This was the same
issue raised by Continental in its motion for partial summary judgment
and the Plaintiffs in their post trial motions. The court noted that in
third party bad faith actions, it was unassailable that damages may
properly include amounts in excess of the stated policy limits.1 48
The court went on to note that first party bad faith actions were,
until 1982, distinguished from the third party action; 149 there was no
fiduciary relationship in first party claims8 0 and as a result, no cogni-
zable common law action for bad faith.' In 1982, the Florida Legisla-
ture enacted the "Bad Faith Statute,"'8 2 and thereafter, both state 53
and federal courts8  have extended a bad faith cause of action to first
party claims.'88
The court looked first to the language of the statute856 and then to
the legislative history, 157 and deduced that the full contours of the stat-
ute should be determined by Florida insurance law including third
party doctrine. 8 The court analyzed other Florida courts' construc-
146. Id. at 1458-59.
147. Id. at 1459.
148. Id. at 1459 n.5. (citing Butchikas v. Travelers Indemnity Corp., 343 So. 2d
816, 817-818.
149. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1459.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1973)).
152. Id. at 1459; (citing FLA. STAT. § 624.155 (1982)).
153. See, e.g., Rowland v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 634 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Fla.
1986); United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Jones, 617 F. Supp. 937; Opperman v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 523 So. 2d
578 (Fla. 1988); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Taylor, No. 84-18844-CA(02)
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1984); Wahl v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th
Cir. Ct. 1987).
154. See, e.g., Opperman, 515 So. 2d 263; Fidelity, No. 84-18844 CA(02);
Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17).
155. See, e.g., Rowland, 634 F. Supp. 613; United Guar., 644 F. Supp. 339;
Jones, 670 F. Supp. 937.
156. Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1460.
157. Id.
158. "The Legislature's comments support the conclusion that it intended the
full contours of the statute to be determined by reference to general principles of Flor-
ida insurance law including third-party doctrine." Id.
[Vol. 15314
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tions of section 624.155 as applicable to first party bad faith claims and
those courts going further, holding that an excess award may be recov-
erable in a first party action.'59 The court used this analysis to form the
basis for granting Jones' motion for judgment not withstanding the
verdict.160
The court determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled, as a matter
of law, to the $366,750 excess1"' damages as well as prejudgment inter-
est. 62 Continental has appealed both of the court's rulings that: (1)
there exists a first party. bad faith cause of action; and (2) that the
proper measure of damages in a first party bad faith case is the differ-
ence between the policy limits and arbitration award.1 13
IV. In Defense of the Bad Faith Statute
Once an uninsured motorist carrier is determined to have acted in
bad faith by failing to settle a claim "when, under all the circum-
stances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and hon-
estly toward its insured and with due regard for his interests,"'" 4 the
issue then becomes one of a determination of damages.16 5 Specifically
with regard to the first-party bad faith 66 action, the question is
whether the damages assessed against the insurer and in favor of the
insured may exceed the policy limits. The legislative history of section
159. Id. The court analyzed: Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17); Fidelity, No. 84-
18844-CA(02); Opperman, 515 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); United
Guar., 644 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Fla 1986).
160. The court ordered, inter alia:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict be, and the same is, hereby GRANTED; the
damage verdict entered by the jury in this cause on April 20, 1989 is
hereby SET ASIDE and JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of the
Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $366,750.00 with pre-
judgment interest on this liquidated sum at a rate specified by law (12%
per annum) commencing from the date of the state court judgment (Octo-
ber 31, 1984). Plaintiff is also awarded a judgment for COSTS OF THIS
ACTION TO BE TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT upon
the filing of an appropriate bill of cost form.
Jones, 716 F. Supp. at 1460.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Jones, 920 F.2d 847.
164. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(I)(b)I.
165. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3).
166. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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624.155, current Florida decisions, sound social policy concerns, and
reference to decisions in other states present a compelling rationale that
damages in excess of the policy limits should be permitted in a first
party bad faith action under section 624.155(1)(b)1.
Florida's bad faith statute is a remedial statute, intended to pro-
vide a remedy for first party bad faith where none existed before. 1 7
The purpose of the statute is to provide redress for insureds and to
impose damages upon insurers as a result of their bad faith. Remedial
statutes, like section 624.155 are required to be liberally construed in
favor of those parties for whose benefit the statute was enacted. Be-
cause section 624.155 provides a first party cause of action, the remedy,
excess damages, is likewise applicable.168 Prior to the enactment of sec-
tion 624.155, first party insurers could intentionally refuse to pay first
party benefits with impunity. 6 9
Florida Statute section 624.155(3) makes the insurer "liable for
damages .. ".. ,170 Since the term "damages is undefined, and is suscep-
tible to varied definitions, 71 each with its own unique implications,"
resort to the legislative history of section 624.155 is necessary to deter-
mine the intent of the Legislature with respect to the definition of
"damages" as used within section 624.155(3). 17 2
167. A remedial statute "is designed to correct existing law, redress existing
grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good; it may also be defined
as a statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong where he had none, or a
different one, before." Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1981). Prior to the
enactment of section 624.155, there was no common law cause of action for first party
bad faith. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
168. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 644 F.
Supp. 339, 342 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
169. See, e.g., Baxter v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), cert. dismissed, 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975); Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Brasecker, 311 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 31
(Fla. 1976).
170. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(3) (1989).
171. Judge Friedman specifically held that, "[iun reviewing F.S. section 624.155,
the Court is of the opinion that the Statute is not clear or unambiguous." Fidelity &
Cas. Co. of New York v. Taylor, No. 84-18844-CA(02) (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1984),
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3 (emphasis added).
172. According to the court in Foley:
If the language employed by the Legislature in the law itself is clear ...
the Legislative intent is to be found therein .... Of course, il' the phrase-
ology of the act is ambiguous or is susceptible of more than one interpreta-
tion, it is the court's duty to glean the legislative intent from a considera-
tion of the act as a whole, 'the evil to be corrected, the language of the act
[Vol. 15
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Although the Legislative history of section 624.155 is brief, it spe-
cifically addresses the issue of excess damages:
"Subparagraph (f) (1.) requires insurers to deal in good faith to
settle claims. Current case law requires this standard in liability
claims, but not in uninsured motorist coverage; the sanction is that
a company is subject to a judgment in excess of policy limits. This
section would apply to all insurance policies.''l73
This history combined with the plain language of section 624.155,
cannot possibly convey more clearly the intent of the drafters that Flor-
ida's Bad Faith Statute applies to first party actions." 4 The language is
as plain as it could possibly be.17 5
Therefore, since the drafters of the statute intended, and court de-
cisions held,' that the Legislature intended to make section 624.155
applicable to the first party actions as well as third party actions, it is
logical that the Legislature intended to apply the same remedy.177 As
further evidence of the Legislature's intent that excess damages be re-
coverable in first party actions, section 624.155 was amended on June
1, 1990.178
Amending section 624.155 F.S.: clarifying Legislative intent with
respect to the issues of ... the definition of damages; ... (7) ..
.[t]he damages recoverable pursuant to this section shall include
those damages which are reasonably foreseeable as a result of a
... the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in exis-
tence bearing on the subject . .. .'
Foley v. State, 50 So. 2d 179, 184 (Fla. 1951).
173. STAFF REPORT - 1982 INSURANCE CODE SUNSET REvIsION, at 12 (HB 4F;
as amended by HB 10e June 3, 1982).
174. Telephone interview with Eric Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982
version of section 624.155 and member of the drafting committee for the 1990 amend-
ments effective October 1, 1990 (October 1, 1990). (Paraphrasing of statements of Eric
Tilton, Esquire).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Rowland v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 634 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Fla.
1986); Jones, 670 F. Supp. 937; WahI, No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
177. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 16; Telephone interview with Eric
Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982 version of section 624.155 and member of
the drafting committee for the 1990 amendments effective October 1, 1990 (October 1,
1990). Mr. Tilton expressed the opinion that the language could not have been made
any clearer to apply the bad faith statute to first and third party claims alike.
178. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(7) (1990).
1991]
21
Buschman: The Availability of Excess Damages in First-Party Bad Faith Cases
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
specified violation of this section by the insurer and may include an
award or judgment in an amount that exceeds the policy limits. 17 19
Thus, the Legislature again pronounced that excess damages are avail-
able in actions under section 624.155 and because section 624.155 ap-
plies to first and third party claims, so does the availability of excess
damages. 80
The insurer is not without protection under the statute. The in-
surer is given sixty days, from the time the insured gives notice to the
Department of Insurance and the insurer of the alleged violation, to
conduct its investigation, evaluate the case and respond to offers of set-
tlement. 8' If the damages are paid or the alleged violation corrected
within this sixty day period, no action for bad faith is permitted. 82
This period is important to any action for bad faith. The conduct of the
insurer throughout the entire period up to trial or arbitration is the
gauge of bad faith.
In Jones,'8" despite the overwhelming evidence of no fault on the
part of Karen Jones,8 the limited insurance available from the tort
feasor,' 8 ' the potential for excess damages, and the insurer's attorney's
evaluation of the case, 86 Continental never responded to settlement de-
mands, even with a one dollar offer, until the eve of arbitration. 87 Sim-
ilarly, in Wahl v. Insurance Co. of North America (INA), 88 the in-
sured was comatose for two weeks with resultant brain damage.'89
Despite INA's evaluation of the value of the case as being in excess of
the policy limits, it made no offer during pre-suit negotiations or during
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Because the drafters intended section 624.155 to apply to both first and
third party causes of action, it is obvious that the new damages provision applies as
well. The drafters could not have made it any clearer. Telephone interview with Eric
Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982 version of section 624.155 and member of
the drafting committee for the 1990 amendments effective October 1. 1990 (October 1,
1990).
181. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(a) (1989).
182. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(2)(d) (1989).
183. 716 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
184. 650 F. Supp. at 939; Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 1.
185. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111 at 1-2.
186. See supra, note 122 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
188. No. 87-1187 CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
189. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 29.
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the 60 day period.190 INA did offer $69,000 on the eve of arbitration.
The arbitrators awarded a total of $787,468.20. After trial, the judge
held that the "shortfall" was recoverable as a matter of law. 19'
Other jurisdictions permitting recovery for first party bad faith
have defined the obligation on the part of the insurer as follows:
[Alt the very least, . . . the insurer will diligently investigate the
facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is Valid, will fairly
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably
in rejecting or settling the claim .... These performances are the
essence of what the insured has bargained and paid for, and the
insurer has the obligation to perform them. When an insurer has
breached this duty, it is liable for damages suffered in consequence
of that breach l912
In Bucholtz v. Safeco Insurance Co.,9 3 the insured sued the in-
surer for an excess judgment allegedly due to Safeco's bad faith in fail-
ing to settle the case. 194 The court affirmed the summary judgment in
favor of the carrier because Safeco did handle the claim reasonably. 19 5
Judge Tursi, in dissent, described the duty of good faith as including
"the requirement that the insurer investigate the factual predicates of
the claim of liability and not unreasonably persist in defenses that are
without foundation in either fact or law."'19 In Jones,91 the defendant
presented no evidence to support its only defense which was that Karen
Jones was negligent in failing to wear her seat belt. 19
Not every transgression by an insurer or complaint by an insured
will suffice to sustain a cause of action for bad faith. Admittedly, an
insurer is not in business to lose money. The insurer wants to minimize
190. Id. at 30.
191. Brief of Appellant, supra note 90, at 31.
192. Weese v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1989). (First
party recovery available under West Virginia's Unfair Trade Practices Act but not on
a tort theory).
193. 773 P.2d 590 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
194. Id. at 592.
195. Id. at 593; cf. Martin v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., No. 87-CV-19335 (Denver
County, Colorado) ($255,000 verdict against insurer who acted in bad faith in refusing
to pay $50,000 uninsured motorist claim).
196. Id. at 594. (Tursi, J., dissenting).
197. 716 F. Supp. 1456.
198. Brief of Appellees, supra note 111, at 3.
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payment while the insured wants to maximize his recovery."' However,
when an insurer embarks on a course of conduct as in Jones,200 WahP01
or McLeod 02 where liability is clear and an award of damages in ex-
cess of the policy is foreseeable, 203 it should not complain when an ex-
cess verdict is rendered.
Insurers maintain that any damages awarded were due to the acts
of the uninsured driver and not the insurer. Therefore, the insurer
should not be liable for the excess verdict. 04 However, this reasoning
ignores the fact that the insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage
for this specific eventuality. Had the insurer dealt with its insured in
good faith, there would be no bad faith suit and no excess verdict. But
for the unreasonable acts of the insurer, there would be no excess judg-
ment.2 °5 Curiously the second district's recent opinion in McLeod
seems to dismiss this question of causation. According to the McLeod
court, the best an insured can hope for, following lengthy litigation of a
bad faith claim, is interest on unpaid benefits (up to the policy limits),
attorney fees, and costs. 06 This holding sends a clear message to any
insurer who is faced with a legitimate serious damage claim and a
large policy: feel free to withhold payment on the policy and litigate.
Liability is limited, roll the dice. This was not the legislature's intent
when it drafted section 624.155.
199. Weese, 879 F.2d at 118.
200. 716 F.2d 1456.
201. No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987).
202. No. 89-2586 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
203. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(7) (1990).
204. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, supra note 84, at 22; Brief 3f Appellees, supra
note 111, at 13; McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785.
205. "Reasonably foreseeable," as used in the 1990 amendment, means exactly
what it says. It is reasonably foreseeable that if an insurer, first or third party, is found
liable for a violation of Section 624.155, that insurer will be liable for damages, and
these damages may exceed the policy limits. The drafters did not differentiate between
first and third party bad faith because the statute applies equally to both. Telephone
interview with Eric Tilton, Esquire, Editor-In-Chief of the 1982 version of section
624.155 and member of the drafting committee for the 1990 amendments effective
October 1, 1990 (October 1, 1990).
206. McLeod, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 2785, 2786. Contra Opperinan, 515 So. 2d at
267 (citing 15A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 58.1 (1983))("The function of the bad
faith claim is to provide the insured with an extra-contractual remedy.")
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As a matter of policy, excess judgments in first party bad faith
actions should be recoverable as a matter of law. The remedial purpose
of section 624.155 cannot be satisfied without the imposition of dam-
ages, including excess judgments. To do otherwise would take the teeth
out of the statute.0 7 If excess judgments are not permitted, there is
little or no reason to require insurers to act in good faith when handling
a first party claim.
It was the actions of insurers which prompted the Legislature to
enact section 624.155. Insurers were reaping the benefits of premiums
from uninsured motorist coverage, and refusing to pay valid claims. Af-
ter all, what did they have to lose? An insurer could intentionally re-
fuse to pay a valid claim and place the insured in a position where his
medical bills would not be paid. This conduct may also take its toll on
the insured's emotional well being. The insurer could take a chance on
arbitration or a jury. If the award was lower than the policy limits, the
insurer wins. If the award was in excess of the policy limits, the insurer
would pay no more than the policy. Prior to the enactment of section
624.155 it was a win-win situation for insurers. 0 8
Insurance companies do not prosper by paying claims - this is a
fact. As a response to the abuses of insureds by insurers, the Florida
Legislature enacted section 624.155 to provide a remedy for insureds.
207. "To hold other than that the remedy is an award of the excess would emas-
culate the remedial purpose of the statute regarding first party claims." Brief of Ami-
cus Cariae, Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers at 6, McLeod, No. 89-2586 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App.).
208. In an excerpt from the trial in Wahl, counsel for INA aptly described the
state of first party bad faith law prior to the enactment of section 624.155:
Before this statute [section 624.155] was passed, an insurance com-
pany could say to a plaintiff 'Hey, I'm not going to pay you, I am - I
don't - I think your case is worth ten bucks less than you say it is and
I'm still going to make you arbitrate.' They could go ahead, get hit for a
$250,000 award, write him a check for two hundred and say 'That's all she
wrote, I don't owe you another nickel.' There was no basis for anything.
They couldn't get any costs back, except arbitration costs, couldn't get
emotional distress, anything incurred for having to litigate something that
should have been settled.
The Legislature came along and said 'Well, we're going to amend
that. Now you're going to have a statutory claim for any damages that are
caused by that bad faith.'
Wahl, No. 87-1187-CA(17) (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1987) (Excerpt of Proceedings, page
16, dated June 6, 1989).
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The Legislature and the courts have applied section 624.155 to first
party claims as well as third party claims. There is no differentiation in
the statute concerning damages that can be awarded in first party
claims as opposed to third party claims. The recent amendments to sec-
tion 624.155 support the position that damages should be measured by
the excess award over the policy limits in first party claims as well at
third party claims. The federal and Florida trial courts have held that
these damages are recoverable as a matter of law The rationale for
these holdings is compelling. The Florida Supreme Court will have an
opportunity to squarely address and put to rest the question of what the
measure of recovery in a first party bad faith action should be.
209
Marc S. Buschman
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